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Abstract 
 
 
From the point of view of modern neo-institutional economics, blockchain is 
an institutional technology that minimizes transaction costs and leads to the 
elimination of intermediation. Using the example of the blockchain, I demonstrate 
the possibilities of post-institutionalism – a new generation of methodologies and 
theories of institutional analysis, alternative to neo-institutional economics. Based 
on the theory of transaction value, I argue that the blockchain technologies will not 
radically reduce transaction costs, but will reorient intermediaries to improving the 
quality of transactions and expanding the offer of additional transaction services. 
Using the theory of institutional assemblages, I argue that it is impossible to form a 
homogeneous system of blockchain-based institutions associated exclusively with 
the principles of decentralization, transparency and openness. Blockchain-based 
institutions will be of a hybrid nature, combining elements of opposing 
institutional logics – regulatory and algorithmic law, Ricardian and smart 
contracts, private and public systems, uncontrollability and arbitration. 
Keywords: institutions, institutional complexity, transactions, transaction 
costs, transaction value, post-institutionalism. 
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Introduction 
 
Blockchain is a digital technology for keeping replicated distributed ledger. 
It ensures the implementation of transactions by equal participants in a digital 
format without the involvement of intermediaries. Typically, the blockchain is 
associated primarily with cryptocurrencies (primarily with Bitcoin) and their 
mining. But this technology now goes far beyond the borders of the financial 
sector and in the future will cover most of the transactions. The key technologies in 
the blockchain ecosystem — smart contracts, asset tokenization, and decentralized 
applications1 — can cause many changes in the organization of business processes, 
the activities of government agencies, and people's daily lives. These changes are 
mainly related to the decentralization of transactions, their automation (more 
precisely, algorithmization, since the blockchain is based on consensus algorithms) 
and a drastic decrease in transaction costs.   
The blockchain seems to me a good example for demonstrating the obvious 
limitations and deficiencies of the traditional approaches of institutional analysis in 
studying phenomena of high complexity. Complexity is an insurmountable barrier 
for modern neoinstitutional economic theory, all the tools of which are 
“sharpened” for the study of fairly simple institutional structures of pre-network 
capitalism. We often forget that neoinstitutional theories of transaction costs and 
institutions as the rules of the game were created at the turn of the 1980s and 90s. 
(Williamson, 1985; North, 1990), i.e. before the advent of the Internet, which 
radically transformed the entire institutional system. These theories are already 
failing when trying to use them to analyze modern institutions. But in the world 
with a widely used blockchain, they will become quite archaic. Moreover, the 
failures of these theories have only become aggravated as a result of the dramatic 
complication of the reality they describe. But these failures are generated by 
internal defects of neoinstitutional theory, first of all, by its one-sidedness. 
Further, I will show that studying the blockchain only from the point of view 
of the theory of transaction costs, as S. Davidson, P. De Filippi and J. Potts do, 
gives an extremely distorted idea of it and requires addition from the point of view 
of the transaction value theory. In addition, blockchain-based institutions research 
suggests applying the institutional assemblages theory approach. This will make it 
possible to shift the emphasis on heterogeneity, hybridity, modularity, 
fragmentation and fluidity of fluidity as critical properties of the economic 
institutions of capitalism today - and especially after the massive introduction of 
blockchains. These new theoretical approaches relate to the arsenal of post-
institutionalism - the avant-garde direction of institutional research, revising 
methodological conventions and dogmas of neoinstitutional theory from the 
standpoint of their adequacy for studying the institutional complexity of modern 
economic and social systems2. 
  
Blockchain and transaction value 
 
Like any other technology, blockchain should be considered from the 
standpoint of two influential theoretical approaches - Schumpeterian and Coasian 
(Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 2018. P. 640.). 
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 Smart contracts are automatically executed (self-executable) contracts in the form of a 
blockchain-based computer algorithm. Decentralized Applications (DApps) - smart contracts 
outside financial relationships. Tokenization - transfer of ownership of tangible and intangible 
assets into digital format (tokens). 
2
 The research program, as well as the conceptual framework of post-institutional 
analysis, is still in the formative stage (Cleaver, 2012; Cleaver, De Koning, 2015). 
In terms of the Schumpeterian paradigm, blockchain is a radical disruptive 
innovation and (potentially) general purpose technology. The blockchain's 
radicalism is associated with the great depth of the transformations of technology, 
infrastructure, markets and society that it generates. In addition, the blockchain can 
dramatically reduce the average level of transaction costs. Blockchain as a 
disruptive innovation will lead to the emergence of new, more efficient models of 
business, regulation, consumption, etc. The result is a new “blue ocean” 
(unoccupied market space) (Kim, Mauborgne, 2005), as well as “blue” seas, bays, 
lagoons, lakes and smaller market niches with (as yet) extremely low competition. 
The blockchain has the characteristics of a general purpose technology (GPT) 
(Pilkington, 2016; Kane, 2017), namely, a variety of application areas and good 
compatibility with other technologies (technological complementarity). Since the 
blockchain is transforming GPT (Lipsey, Carlaw, Bekar, 2005), it is highly likely 
to create a huge “tree” of technology trends and applications. Based on the 
blockchain, a multi-level ecosystem with a long-term self-development potential 
will be formed. This guarantees the emergence of new generations of blockchain 
technologies and related breakthrough and improving innovations. In fact, the 
blockchain will increase the cumulative productivity of all factors of production 
and will create a cascade of constructive-destructive processes and effects 
(including indirect and deferred), and it will also cause serious transformations of 
industries, professions and institutions. 
The Shumpeterian view of the blockchain can be constructively 
complemented with the viewpoint of the Coasean paradigm. From this point of 
view, the blockchain is regulatory (De Filippi, Hassan, 2016) or, more generally, 
institutional technology for implementing decentralized transactions without 
intermediaries and minimizing transaction costs (Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 
2018. P. 641). Blockchain eliminates the need for intermediaries - the state, banks, 
notaries, auditors, brokers, insurers, accountants, lawyers, etc. As a result, the 
blockchain can radically reduce the costs of transactions and increase the 
efficiency of all economic processes and systems, regardless of their scale and 
specificity. The blockchain will erase “paper footprint” and speed up the execution 
of transactions, facilitate the authentication of assets and the tracking of contract 
performance. Blockchain is a disruptive institutional technology because it 
destroys the order of transactions that exists in almost all markets and implies the 
existence of intermediaries. From the point of view of Coaseans, the blockchain in 
the long term eliminates the system of intermediation in the markets as an 
institutional fact. In the Coasean sense, the blockchain ranks with the main 
economic institutions of capitalism — the market, the firm, and the state — and 
acts as an alternative mode of economic coordination (Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 
2018. P. 641). Moreover, it can be stated with high confidence that the blockchain 
is an institutional GPT that can create qualitatively new types of transactions and 
contracts, business models and institutions. As a result, the blockchain will destroy 
many of the fundamental elements of the former (pre-digital) institutional order. 
But is the Coasean (neo-institutional) approach, focused on minimizing 
transaction costs, sufficient for understanding the real institutional nature of the 
blockchain and determining the prospects for its evolution? My answer is 
definitely not. 
Like other effective institutional innovations, blockchain significantly 
reduces transaction costs (Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 2018. P. 648-653). Thus, 
blockchain has a positive effect on the effectiveness of various types of economic 
activity and the economy as a whole. This is a conventional view in Coasean 
paradigm (and, generally, in new institutional economics), which is shared as by 
scientific and by expert community. Blockchain has big potential to reduce 
transaction costs (Blockchain, a catalyst ..., 2017. P. 17), creates numerous 
opportunities for drastically reducing transaction costs (Blockchain Technology ..., 
2017. P. 1), significantly reduces the time and costs of transactions (Morabito, 
2017. P. 26), and so on. Here are the costs of regulation, verification, ensuring 
security, storing transactional data, monitoring opportunism, etc. By systematic 
influence on minimizing transaction costs, blockchain is even compared with 
Protestant ethics (Hazard, Sclavounis, Stieber, 2016), which, according to Max 
Weber, was the catalyst for the formation of capitalist institutions. 
But recognition of the fact that blockchain comprehensively reduces 
transaction costs (and therefore it is not Schumpeterian, but Coasean or 
institutional technology) is still not enough to understand its real complexity. 
Institutional technologies should not only reduce transaction costs, but also 
increase transaction value. In the case of blockchain, this is more than obvious. 
The theory of transactional value so far has exclusively a framework 
character and occupies peripheral positions in modern institutional economics. 
More precisely, this theory is almost indistinguishable on the map of institutional 
ideas3. Rare and too narrowly specialized works in this area have not developed 
into a critical mass that can lead to a serious revision of the dominant 
neoinstitutional approach. Neoinstitutionalists unilaterally consider institutions and 
institutional technologies exclusively in terms of minimizing transaction costs. At 
the same time, the transaction value generated by institutions and technologies is 
usually ignored. Transaction value is a combination of various positive effects for 
participants in transactions. The implementation of any transaction leads not only 
to its main result (for example, buying and selling goods and services, obtaining a 
loan, transferring money, etc.), but also to the mass of additional results or effects, 
which together characterize the quality of the transaction. The sum of the costs of a 
single or complex transaction (total transaction costs) includes the costs of 
obtaining both the main and additional results. In the institutional system based on 
intermediation, both the main and additional results of the vast majority of 
transactions can be acquired on the market as transactional services of 
intermediaries. Then “transaction services are the observable element of 
transaction costs” (Wallis, North, 1986. P. 99)4. Moreover, the proportions of 
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 A pioneering article on this issue (Zajac, Olsen, 1993) was devoted to the management 
of interorganizational interactions and strategies, which did not contribute to its serious 
perception by institutional theorists. 
4
 In this regard, Wallis and North pointed to "a common but erroneous perception among 
corollary benefit" (Wallis, North, 1988. P. 654). 
transaction costs associated with obtaining the main and additional results of 
transactions vary depending on their quality. Hence the difference in prices, for 
example, for standard and premium services of lawyers, realtors, insurers and other 
intermediaries. In an institutional system based on blockchain, the main results of 
most transactions are provided by algorithms, i.e. carried out automatically, 
without the intermediaries. However, additional transaction services that form the 
quality of transactions can not always be provided with blockchain technologies. 
From the point of view of the theory of transaction costs, the blockchain 
crowding out intermediaries as a “necessary evil” of a market economy — and a 
source of excessive transaction costs, which are due to the established institutional 
order — has extremely positive consequences. Moreover, the disappearance of 
intermediation is inevitable, since the costly trust in the intermediary (trusted third 
party) is replaced by free trust in the blockchain protocol (Davidson, De Filippi, 
Potts, 2018. P. 644). However, from the standpoint of the theory of transaction 
value, the complete elimination of intermediaries is nothing more than an illusion, 
although the scope and forms of intermediation will certainly undergo significant 
changes. However, even if blockchain dominates, intermediaries will be able to 
add value to participants in transactions, so their services will be in demand. 
For example, blockchain competitors in the field of cashless payments - for 
example, Visa and Master Card - offer many additional services: direct discounts 
and cashbacks, accumulative bonuses, special privileges and offers from partners 
in various fields (from transport services, recruitment and software for business to 
travel, restaurants, museums, attractions, educational courses, etc.). All this is an 
additional transaction value for users of the cashless payment systems. Key players 
in the field of distributed (cloud) data storage - Google, Apple, Microsoft, 
Dropbox, Amazon, etc. - also offer additional features. These include unlimited 
storage, synchronization between devices, recovery of deleted files, setting access 
levels, using a corporate account for collaboration, file encryption, etc. These are 
also elements of transaction value. 
In the case of banks and exchanges, which are expected to become the main 
victims of the blockchain, the approach of transaction cost theory is also shows its 
limitations. Of course, if the bank is understood only as an intermediary institution 
with the function of centralized ledger maintenance, then it is obvious that 
switching to the blockchains (that is, decentralized ledgers) automatically 
undermines the demand for banking services (McMillan, 2014; MacDonald, Allen, 
Potts, 2016). But we should not forget that banks provide a lot of additional 
services in the area of minimizing risks and improving the quality of transactions. 
Among them are co-branded cards, preferential credit programs, reversibility of 
transfers, insurance, biometric authentication, customer support system, tax refund, 
cost management, geolocation offers, interactive interface, etc. It is extremely 
difficult to give generalizing legal definition to modern banking (McMillan, 2014. 
P. 8) due to the variety of additional transaction services. 
The exchanges also offer a set of transaction services besides intermediation 
and, accordingly, “production” prices. Thus, post-trade services (clearing, 
depository and settlement operations, etc.), market analytics, IT-support and other 
services now make up 35% of the total income of stock exchanges (OECD ..., 
2016. P. 123). Such services (and the associated transaction value) are not offered 
by decentralized exchanges - blockchain-based trading platforms. In addition, pre-
trading and post-trading services are an extremely important product of capital 
market infrastructure providers, such as trading platforms, clearing organizations, 
inter-dealer brokers, depositories, specialized service companies (Capital Markets 
..., 2017. P. 4). 
The elimination of intermediaries will undoubtedly reduce the cost of 
transactions, but will clearly lead to a drop in their quality, in particular, will cause 
a systemic increase in risks. It is not by chance that in 2017, the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission equated tokens issuers (attracting investors' capital through 
ICO)5 to traditional issuers of equity securities, extending to them all the norms of 
current legislation (Report ..., 2017. P. 17-18). Such a decision is quite logical, 
since digitization in the case of ICO affects only institutional form of transactions, 
but not their content (investment attraction), while the requirements for the issuer 
in the case of ICO are minimal. The negative effects of ICO (including the growth 
of fraud, the increase in the number of obviously unreliable issuers and over-risky 
projects) clearly outweigh its positive consequences - and are not compensated for 
by eliminating the middlemen as such. 
In general, the prerequisites for the active implementation of the blockchain 
are created by an overproduction of low-quality transactional services in the vast 
majority of markets. Therefore, the result of the large-scale “blockchaining” of the 
economy will be the optimization (in the sense of reducing) the scale of the 
transaction sector. This will be achieved at the expense of crowding out archaic 
and traditional forms of intermediation based on the exploitation of imperfections 
and defects of market institutions and being sources of excessive, economically 
unjustified transaction costs for participants in transactions. But at the same time, 
contrary to the forecasts of neoinstitutionalists (Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 2018. 
P. 640, 643-644), there will not be a complete disappearance of intermediary 
activities - most of them will be reformatted. We should expect a massive 
reorientation of intermediaries to improve the quality of transactions and related 
transactional services. In other words, there will be a tougher competition of 
intermediaries in the area of production of transaction value, and not in the area of 
reducing transaction costs. In the new reality, the cost of intermediaries will be 
extra costs for additional high-quality transaction services – knowledge intensive, 
highly specialized, customized, etc. 
At the same time, traditional intermediaries will actively use blockchain 
technologies - for example, private blockchains and incorporative blockchain 
applications (O'Dair, 2019. P. 26), - which increase the efficiency of transactions 
without requiring radical reformatting of existing institutions. As a result, 
intermediaries will benefit from the reduction transaction costs, but at the same 
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 ICO (initial coin offering) is an alternative IPO (initial public offering) and a much 
cheaper way of attracting investments through crowdfunding, which initially did not require 
compliance with strict regulatory requirements for public companies. 
time block the scenario of dismantling the intermediation system (Carson et al., 
2018. P. 4-5). The transaction sector will become more compact and efficient, and 
the volume of excess transaction costs (payment imposed on intermediaries 
transaction services) will decline sharply. Intermediaries will be ousted from the 
lower price segments and (gradually) will no longer be perceived as “system-
imposed” sources of transaction costs. They are transforming their value 
proposition to ensure high-quality transactions. It is in this direction that banking 
innovations are now intensified, in particular. 
Already, a new generation of intermediaries in the financial markets - 
Fintech companies - are not just reducing transaction costs for their clients; they 
offer them additional transaction value: “Their superior value proposition is based 
on the argument that they are able operate with an innovation agility that 
traditional banks are unable to provide, have a better understanding of today’s 
technologies and are able to laser focus on narrow solutions to the exact needs of 
the customers” (Molnár, 2018. P. 45). In my opinion, the basis of value 
propositions of intermediaries in the era of blockchains will be hyper-relevant 
transaction services associated with continuous, interactive, highly personalized 
offers based on anticipating the needs of each customer. This will be achieved with 
the help of digital technologies – predictive analytics, artificial intelligence, and 
digital assistants (Accenture Strategy, 2017; Wollah et al., 2017). The 
intermediaries of the new generation will focus on creating additional transaction 
value for consumers in new areas of customer experience, as well as on building 
trust capital as a critical factor in hyper-personalization. 
The blockchain in combination with other digital technologies creates the 
most comfortable conditions for the development of interactive organizations of a 
market-like type - platforms. Platforms are not so much multilateral markets as in 
their traditional interpretation (Rochet, Tirole, 2003; Evans, 2003), but rather 
multi-actor "spontaneous organizations" (MacDonald, Allen, Potts, 2016. P. 286), 
which are institutional alternative to traditional organizations. However, platform 
analysis only from the standpoint of minimizing transaction costs (Martens, 2016, 
P. 17) is too narrow. Blockchains does not eliminate transaction costs in general, 
but changes their causes and specific forms. In particular, market failures are 
replaced by no less destructive platform failures. There are examples of parallel 
reduction in transaction costs for some actors of platforms and increase for others. 
Thus, blockchain recruitment platforms simultaneously reduce transaction costs for 
employers and increase them for freelance workers, who are also delegated the 
main risks (Drahokoupil, Piasna, 2017). In addition, rating assessment systems 
based on user feedback often exacerbate failures of the platforms (Querbes, 2018. 
P. 641). 
It is important that platforms are not so much intermediaries (in the 
traditional sense), as moderators. They do not just facilitate transactions (reducing 
their costs), but provide participants with a wide range of transaction services, 
linking networks of developers and networks of consumers into a single ecosystem 
of value co-creation. Therefore, in the near future, integrated platforms will 
become dominant. They will combine the possibilities of transactional, innovation 
and investment types of platforms (Evans, Gawer, 2016. P. 21). Such integrated 
platforms will allow you to quickly form networks and communities around new 
projects, attracting investment, connecting many developers and forming 
collaborations, creating and promoting new products to the market and quickly 
receiving feedback from consumers. But the rise of the platforms happening before 
our eyes is the result not only and not so much of their minimization of transaction 
costs, as of offering a unique transaction value. 
So, considering the blockchain in the Coasean sense - as an institutional 
general purpose technology - it is necessary to take into account not just the 
reduction of excessive transaction costs, but, above all, the maximization of 
transaction value provided by the blockchain technologies. The blockchain's value 
proposition varies depending on the types of transactions (and, more broadly, types 
of economic activities)6, so its implementation will not lead to the widespread 
destruction of intermediation, but will inevitably cause its institutional 
transformations of different depths. In general, intermediaries under pressure from 
blockchain technologies will have to emphasize the transaction value delivered to 
customers - additional services that improve the quality of transactions. This trend 
will affect all intermediaries without exception - from banks, stock exchanges, 
auditing and insurance companies to streaming music services. 
 
Blockchain as an institutional assemblage 
 
Analysis of the blockchain from the standpoint of its institutional complexity 
requires the abandonment of the fundamental method of the new institutional 
economic theory - a comparative analysis of discrete institutional alternatives. 
Further, we will show that, in principle, a blockchain cannot be systematically 
described by any discrete institutional alternative separately and does not constitute 
a homogeneous institutional system. The blockchain generates not a homogeneous, 
but a multifaceted, heterogeneous, hybrid institutional system. Therefore, it is 
promising to use another post-institutional approach - the theory of institutional 
assemblages. 
The assemblage is a “roomy” interdisciplinary term introduced by the 
philosophers Gilles  Deleuze and Felix  Guattari in the 1970s and 80s (Deleuze, 
Guattari, 2005) 7. The assemblage in the most general sense is understood as the set 
of elements of a fundamentally different nature, united by their co-functioning 
(Deleuze, Parnet, 1977. P. 52). At the same time, integration into the system does 
not follow from the internal logic of its elements: being interconnected, they 
remain fairly autonomous (DeLanda, 2016. P. 2). Parts of the assemblage do not 
form a seamless monolithic or “organic” whole (Delanda, 2018. P. 10-11), and the 
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 For example, in the field of commercial real estate, blockchain is best suited for 
automating short-term rental relations with a large number of tenants (Blockchain in ..., 2017. P. 
14.). 
7
 More precisely, it originated in the English translation of the term “agencement”, the 
key one for the book of Deleuze and Guattari. 
assemblage itself does not become a totally integrated unity: after all, assemblages 
are hybrid and fuzzy systems constructed from heterogeneous parts. 
Like any other systems, assemblages are characterized by synergy (mutual 
reinforcement of elements, which creates an effect that exceeds the total) and 
emergence, i.e. the presence of system properties that are not reducible to the 
properties of elements. But, unlike standard systems8 with their unitarity, solidity 
and homogenization, assemblages are characterized by other key properties - 
heterogeneity, redundancy, modularity, interchangeability, multifunctionality, 
hybridity, fragmentation, entanglement, plasticity. 
In this sense, the theory of assemblages, like “assemblage thinking is about 
relations, heterogeneity, and differences rather than parts, homogeneity, and 
similarities” (Kamalipour, 2015. P. 404). In assemblages, instead of identical 
elements, there are functionally diverse modules. Modules are fairly free to add, 
are interchanged and replaced by others; while the modules interact, but also 
compete with each other. 
The basis of assemblages is a symbiosis of heterogeneous and largely 
independent elements. A classic example of assemblage is a knight on horseback 
(Deleuze, Parnet, 1977. P. 52), which, if we continue this metaphorical line, is 
fundamentally different from the centaur, i.e. totally integrated system9. It is not by 
chance that it is organismic metaphors that are most consistently and severely 
criticized by the theory of assemblages. Another example of assemblage given by 
Deleuze and Guattari is the plant and its insects pollinating it (Deleuze, Guattari, 
2005. P. 10). Wasp and orchid as heterogeneous elements, as completely different 
self-sufficient entities belonging to different biological kingdoms, form a 
symbiosis in the process of co-evolution. This symbiotic system is not inseparable: 
both wasps and orchids can exist completely independently of each other. 
However, they are interdependent during the pollination period, when wasps 
receive nectar, and orchids transfer pollen. If in standard systems all elements are 
connected by logically necessary relations resulting from their nature (and the 
internal logic of development), then in assemblages these relations can only be 
relatively obligatory, that is, they become obligatory during co-evolution (Delanda, 
2018. P. 20). 
Assemblages are characterized by high adaptability and plasticity, even 
fluidity. Since assemblages are not organic unities and combine intertwining 
heterogeneous elements, they are constantly experiencing internal tensions and 
therefore are in a fluid reassembly process. Such a reassembly is a co-evolutionary 
process of self-organization and self-ordering, “in which the elements put together 
are not fixed in shape” (Law, 2004. P. 42). If we use mechanistic metaphors, then a 
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 Standard systems are understood to mean systems whose elements form an inseparable, 
monolithic whole. 
9
 A knight on the horse combines ontologically diverse elements - a rider, a horse, 
weapons and equipment (stirrups, harness, horse armor, etc.) - and it is a typical “assemblage of 
war” (Deleuze, Parnet, 1977. P. 52). But this assemblage can be easily disassembled into 
modules and transformed: for example, the rider is transferred to the infantry, the horse - to the 
quartermaster service, and the weapons and ammunition are redistributed between warriors. 
standard system (even a complex adaptive system) is always a transformer, whose 
variations are structurally limited and rigidly defined by its internal logic. On the 
contrary, assemblage is a Lego constructor in which practically any object can be 
assembled from a mass of modules of various shapes. 
The total lack of attention of institutional economists to assemblage themes 
is a serious omission that needs to be corrected. In my definition, institutional 
assemblages are hypercomplex systems of institutions based on parallel existing 
institutional logics and orders10. Institutional assemblages are hybrid and flexible 
systems of multifunctional, intertwining, and intersecting institutions governed by 
alternative principles. For them, hybridity, modularity, polycentricity, interactivity, 
redundancy, fragmentation, plasticity and fluidity are not only organic properties, 
but, above all, evolutionary competitive advantages. 
The confusion of parallel institutional logics, including those that are poorly 
compatible, fundamentally different, and even alternative, is a source of 
constitutive features and internal contradictions of institutional assemblages, since 
connections between their elements are created across different natures (Deleuze, 
Parnet, 1977. P. 69). But the hybridity of institutional logics does not exhaust the 
nature of institutional assemblages11. This is not just a random or temporary 
combination of weakly compatible logics. No, in the case of institutional 
assemblages, the symbiosis of logics is an organic and natural consequence of their 
nature. This is due to the functional redundancy and modular structure of 
assemblages: in the seeming conflict of internal logics, in fact, there is a guarantee 
of the stability of these hypercomplex systems. When the complexity and 
turbulence of the environment grow rapidly, it is assemblages that have the most 
adaptive efficiency. 
The digital economy (including blockchains) has a pronounced assemblage 
nature. This is manifested in the mixing and hybridization of elements of the real 
and virtual, living and inanimate, natural and humanitarian, commercial and non-
commercial, industrial and service, material and digitized worlds. But no matter 
how many of these dissimilar elements are mixed and “whipped”, they never form 
a homogeneous mixture. They remain hybrids, which accounts for the internal 
inconsistency of digitalization. At the same time, the continuous and ubiquitous 
fragmentation of value chains and value co-creation ecosystems actually leads to a 
total modularization of the digital economy. The smallest modules become the 
units of business - extremely atomized elements of business processes, i.e. any 
activities and even operations that can be functionally distinguished from others. 
Digital technologies allow you to effectively manage these modules and they 
(modules) become the basis of the new generation of competitive strategies. For 
example, Fintech startups successfully attack traditional financial institutions by 
focusing on “microscopic” elements - discrete modules –of their business models 
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 Institutional logics are the sets of fundamental values, principles and beliefs that 
underlie institutions. 
11
 Absolutization of this property is a weak point of the theory of hybrid organizations, 
closely adjacent to the theory of institutional assemblages. 
(Bhatt, 2017. P. 106-111). The combination of hybridity and modularity in digital 
technologies and business processes will inevitably affect the specifics of related 
institutions, making them attractive objects for the theory of institutional 
assemblages. After all, the study of those areas where any boundaries are absent in 
principle, requires new, analytically more capacious categories. Just such a 
category are assemblages. 
Blockchain inevitably leads to the creation of new economic activities and 
new ways to enhance the effectiveness of existing activities. As a result, new 
modes of coordinating activities based on blockchains — blockchain-based 
institutions — are emerging. Institutions related with any technology always reflect 
its substantial specificity, acquiring similar features. For example, the institutions 
of the network economy embody the principles of building the Internet and Web 
2.0, including social networks and new media — just recalling definition of 
institutions as cognitive media (Aoki, 2011). Institutions of an industrial society 
are most relevantly described in terms of mechanisms, tools, friction, etc. In the 
case of blockchain-based institutions, it can be safely assumed that these 
institutions will be much more complex than modern ones, and (apparently) these 
will be institutions of a qualitatively new type (Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 2018. 
P. 641, 654). In this sense, the role of the blockchain is not so much to increase the 
effectiveness of the existing system of capitalist institutions, but rather to increase 
its quality progressively - due to the massive introduction of a new type of 
institutions having blockchain nature and expanding the diversity of their specific 
forms of application. 
Institutions based on the blockchain will have pronounced assemblage 
features and properties. The redundancy associated with functional duplication of 
modules (nodes) is technologically built into the architecture of decentralized 
ledgers. Unlike traditional databases, which presuppose centralized storage and 
management, the distributed ledger is copied synchronously to all computers of the 
blockchain participants. Such redundancy (or modularity) is a typical and, 
moreover, constitutive characteristic of assemblages, as well as hybridity. But even 
more important for the systemic understanding of the future of blockchain is 
another property of institutional assemblages - their fluidity, i.e. continuous 
variability, non-fixability of boundaries and states, therefore assemblage systems 
often look like poorly structured, “loose”, fuzzy, blurred. It is impossible to 
determine them once and for all, therefore, below I will consider only a few of the 
most obvious manifestations of the assemblage nature of blockchain-based 
institutions. 
Blockchain is a symbiosis of regulatory and algorithmic law. Any 
technology necessarily generates related institutions that determine the modes of 
coordination of economic activities based on this technology. But each technology 
also includes institutions integrated into it — technical rules and prescribed 
practices of technologically conditioned actions — that literally “tells us what to 
do and how to do it, often in a more compelling manner than the law does” 
(Lanzara, 2009. P. 13). Such technology-integrated institutions will be of 
increasing importance. It is highly likely that the blockchain will cause an 
institutional shift from legal (traditional) rules to code-based rules. Such rules, 
combined into blockchain protocols, are not controlled by actors, but are created, 
modified and maintained by decentralized ledgers (De Filippi, Wright, 2018. P. 7). 
They may comply or not to comply with legal norms, but code-based rules will 
form the basis of the institutional order in the digital economy. In fact, this is 
“code-ification” of law, i.e. hybridization of traditional (legal, regulatory) and 
technological (algorithmic) law, when smart contracts will be used more often than 
traditional ones. In essence, blockchain technologies (i.e., the algorithms 
underlying smart contracts) will perform the functions of standard contracts, with 
the result that the law will be increasingly transformed into code (De Filippi, 
Hassan, 2016). But the complete mixing of legal and code rules still will not 
happen. 
Blockchain is a “bundle” of Ricardian and smart contracts. Contract 
relations in the digital economy will not be fully implemented by smart contracts 
(i.e., contracts that are self-fulfilling using blockchain algorithms), despite their 
enormous effectiveness in reducing excessive transaction costs. Each smart 
contract will be accompanied by a Ricardian contract - a tool for mediating digital 
and text contracts, which allows, on the one hand, “translate” an standard legal 
contract into the “language” of the blockchain, which can be read by an electronic 
system, and, on the other, give a smart contract legal force and allow lawyers and 
counterparties to read it in the usual document format. A mandatory combination 
of Ricardian and smart contracts will become increasingly common. 
Blockchain is a hybrid of decentralization and arbitrage. According to many 
experts, the blockchain is in its essence a decentralization technology (Davidson, 
De Filippi, Potts, 2018. P. 649). This is largely a consequence of the hype around 
Bitcoin, which belongs to decentralized models of blockchain. However, in reality, 
there is a wide range of technologies of distributed ledgers, involving different 
levels of centralization and various forms of control and governance (Walport, 
2016. P. 7). Now the most common are open access blockchains with free entry. 
But in closed access systems, administrators can be delegated not only the 
functions of checking and admitting (or not admitting) new members to the system, 
but also the exclusive right to add entries to the ledger, the right to cancel 
previously confirmed transactions, etc. 
The illusion of the disappearance of intermediaries replaced by blockchains 
must be overcome. An example of a governed blockchain is the EOS blockchain 
platform, which is one of the five leaders in the world ranking of cryptocurrencies 
CoinMarketCap and set a world record for attracting investment through ICO. The 
main document of the platform - the EOS Constitution - introduces an EOS Core 
Arbitration Forum as a dispute resolution body, and also assigns a significant level 
of authority to the arbitrators. Certification and verification of participants and 
transactions are especially important for the Internet of Things, international and 
wholesale trade, etc., where the prospects for hybrid models of blockchain are 
obvious now. 
According to neoinstitutionalists, blockchain technologies will lead to the 
creation of a new type of economic institution - a decentralized collaborative 
organization (DCO)12 (Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 2018. P. 654). In DCO there is 
no hierarchy (as opposed to traditional firms); they carry out both exchange and 
production (as opposed to markets). The power in DCO belongs to the many 
owners of tokens, while all employees are engaged in project work through smart 
contracts. In addition, employees have a rating determined by other owners of 
tokens, and reaching its minimum threshold results in automatic dismissal. 
However, neoinstitutionalists are actually forced to resort to tricks: for example, 
they refer to the work of M. Atzori only in part of the positive assessment of the 
DCO, keeping silent about the fears and risks expressed in it. In particular, we are 
talking about hidden and veiled forms of centralization of power in the DCO, 
which are gradually becoming more common. It is not only about speculation, 
information asymmetry and opacity in blockchain systems13, but also about the 
formation of a new elite of code developers and the oligarchy of blockchain 
platforms’ owners (Atzori, 2015. P. 29-30). These trends fundamentally undermine 
the idea of the blockchain's egalitarian nature. Therefore, neo-institutional ideas 
about the blockchain should be recognized as very naive and generally related to 
high-tech versions of libertarian utopias. As institutional assemblages, DCOs will 
never be completely horizontal and will inevitably include significant features of 
the hierarchy. They will not create a new type of economic order associated with 
anonymous peer-to-peer interactions based on automatic enforcement of rules 
through smart contracts (Davidson, De Filippi, Potts, 2018. P. 654). Anonymity 
will be partial, equality will be undermined by the formation of new elites, and the 
blockchain's “invisible hand” will face numerous failures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Blockchain is a complex digital technology that is the basis of fundamentally 
new ways of coordinating transactions. The blockchain can rightfully be 
considered an institutional technology that can bring about radical innovations in 
the current system of economic institutions of capitalism. However, modern 
neoinstitutional theory offers a rather simplified toolkit for understanding the real 
institutional complexity of the blockchain. As a result, institutional economists 
who study blockchain come to one-sided and often idealistic conclusions, 
predicting the elimination of intermediation, elimination of control, total 
decentralization, etc. These conclusions are a sad consequence of the moral 
obsolescence of the methodology of neoinstitutionalism. But it is also the impetus 
                                               
12
 In essence, this is an analogue of the term “decentralized autonomous organization”, 
which is widely used in modern blockchain practice.  
13
 Although the blockchain (like the Internet) was originally created as a non-mediated 
technology, a number of third parties have emerged in the modern blockchain ecosystem. They 
are engaged in a profitable business on intermediary services, including those based on hidden 
information asymmetry between developers and users. In blockchain systems, the emergence of 
dominant players is quite possible - and this risk is now being realized with increasing clarity. 
These players can abuse their status, because “whoever controls mining also controls the 
protocol” (Kritikos, 2018. P. 2), i.e. certification of the validity of transactions.  
for the development of a new generation of institutional theories overcoming the 
built-in limitations of neoinstitutional methodology. I combine such alternatives to 
neoinstitutionalism under the term “post-institutionalism”. 
Using the blockchain example, this paper presented two particular post-
institutional theories - the theory of transaction value (which complements the 
neoinstitutional theory of transaction costs) and the theory of institutional 
assemblages, which is opposed to the analysis of standard institutional systems. 
The neoinstitutional point of view is that the blockchain is a substitute for 
traditional intermediaries (banks, exchanges, notaries, lawyers, insurers, etc.), 
replacing these third parties in transactions with technological (software) solutions 
that minimize transaction costs. However, this conclusion is extremely one-sided 
(since it focuses only on transaction-cost minimizing), and the underlying Coasean 
paradigm needs to be expanded by taking into account the transaction value. 
Blokchain offers cheaper institutional solutions, but the quality of transactions is 
relegated to the background. Transaction value includes not only the direct result 
of the transaction, but also a lot of additional transaction services. Intermediaries 
will actively (and successfully) compete with the blockchain precisely by 
expanding the range of such services and improving the quality of transactions. 
This conclusion could not have been made while remaining within the framework 
of the traditional approach to the theory of transaction costs. 
Neoinstitutionalists predict the formation of a homogeneous system of 
blockchain-based institutions, ensuring total elimination of control, 
decentralization of transactions and the public nature of databases (registries). 
From the point of view of the theory of institutional assemblages, this scenario is 
unrealistic. The hypercomplex institutional systems (assemblages) arising on the 
blockchain contain - and will always contain - a conflict of multiple institutional 
logics. This, for example, is a conflict between technological logic (striving for the 
optimal functionality of software solutions) and bureaucratic logic (aimed at 
creating restrictions and retaining control). This is a conflict between libertarian 
logic (anonymity, decentralization, elimination of intermediaries) and ethical logic 
(reduced potential for carrying out illegal activities of varying degrees). Therefore, 
it is important to proceed from the fundamental impossibility of convergence of 
alternative institutional logics and orders. Blockchain-based institutions will 
inevitably be heterogeneous: for example, they will combine social orders and 
models of regulation of private (“allowed”) and public, open and closed 
blockchains. The understanding of organic hybridity, internal conflict, high 
fragmentation and fluidity of blockchain-based institutions is a consequence of the 
application of the theory of institutional assemblages leading to the abandonment 
of idealistic forecasts and scenarios of the future blockchain. 
We emphasize once again: the methodology and theoretical guidelines of the 
new institutional economy are becoming less and less adequate for the study of the 
institutions of modern digital capitalism. The intensive growth of the institutional 
complexity of the economy and society requires a transition to a new generation of 
methodologies and theories of institutional analysis that can be considered post-
institutional in relation to neo-institutionalism. Instead of the neoinstitutionalist 
mantra on the significance of institutions, post-institutionalism proposes a new 
motto: “Institutional complexity matters!”. A post-institutional research program is 
still being developed, but it is already clear that the development of methodologies 
and theories for analyzing institutional complexity is a top priority task and a 
critical challenge for the community of institutional economists. 
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